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This comprehensive survey deliberated over the security of electronic payment systems. In our research, 
we focused on either dominant systems or new attempts and innovations to improve the level of security of 
the electronic payment systems. This survey consists of the Card-present (CP) transactions and a review of 
its dominant system i.e. EMV including several researches at Cambridge university to designate variant 
types of attacks against this standard which demonstrates lack of a secure ―offline‖ authentication method 
that is one of the main purpose of using the smart cards instead of magnetic stripe cards which are not 
able to participate in authentication process, the evaluation of the EMV migration from RSA cryptosystem 
to ECC based cryptosystem 3. The evaluation of the Card-not-present transactions approaches including 
3D Secure, 3D SET, SET/EMV and EMV/CAP, the impact of concept of Tokenization and the role of Blind 
Signatures schemes in electronic cash and E-payment systems, use of quantum key distribution (QKD) in 
electronic payment systems to achieve unconditional security rather than only computational assurance of 
the security level by using traditional cryptography, the evaluation of Near Field Communication (NFC) 
and the contactless payment systems such as Google wallet, Android Pay and Apple Pay, the assessment 
of the electronic currency and peer to peer payment systems such as Bitcoin. The criterion of our survey for 
the measurement and the judgment about the quality of the security in electronic payment systems was 
this quote: ―The security of a system is only as strong as its weakest link‖ [1]. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays the payment approaches via the internet and the network has been 
growing at a furious pace. In this way, the variety of the electronic payment systems 
consists of a numerous types to achieve a strong level of the security. However, in 
parallel, the attacks procedures and strategies are as advanced as the security 
solutions. In this comprehensive survey, we tried to mention and determine all 
attempts in both sides (i.e. attacks strategies and security solutions). In this way, we 
chose the most dominant electronic payment systems and the most successful attack 
strategies against them.  
The rest of this paper consists of Section 2: Card-present (CP) transactions 2.1:  a 
review of dominant CP transactions system i.e. EMV including several researches at 
Cambridge university to designate variant types of attacks against this standard 
including MITM, pre-play and relay attacks which demonstrates lack of a secure 
―offline‖ authentication method that is one of the main purpose of using the smart 
cards instead of magnetic stripe cards which are not able to participate in 
authentication process, Section 3: the evaluation of the EMV migration from RSA 
cryptosystem to ECC based cryptosystem, Section 4: the evaluation of the Card-not-
present transactions approaches including 3D Secure, 3D SET, SET/EMV and 
EMV/CAP, Section 5 and 6: the impact of concept of Tokenization and the role of 
Blind Signatures schemes in electronic cash and E-payment systems, respectively, 
Section 7: using quantum key distribution (QKD) in electronic payment systems to 
achieve unconditional security rather than only computational assurance of the 
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security level by using traditional cryptography, Section 8: the assessment of the 
electronic currency and peer to peer payment systems such as bitcoin, and Section 9: 
Near Field Communication (NFC) and contactless payment systems along with the 
evaluation of the related technologies such as Google wallet, Android Pay and Apple 
Pay.  
2. CARD PRESENT TRANSACTIONS 
The name of Card-present-transaction (CP) is derived from presentation of the card 
to the merchant by the card holder, at the time of transaction. This means that any 
online payment via internet even in case of using the card by using a card reader (e.g. 
SET/EMV or EMV/CAP) are classified as Card-not-present (CNP) transactions, 
because in such these protocols the card holder does not present the card to the 
merchant and transaction is not performed via a physical point-of-sell (POS).  
In a CP transaction, the card information is sent to the payment gateway and after 
verification, the gateway will send the transaction authorization to the merchant 
along with a receipt to the card holder. In such this transaction, in case of fraud by 
customer, the merchant is not liable of the losses because of the payment gateway 
authorization. [2]  
The dominant system in Card-present-transaction is EMV (sometimes called as Chip 
and PIN). In following section, we describe briefly this system along with its major 
vulnerabilities against MITM [6], Pre-play [11] and relay [12] attacks. 
 
2.1 EMV: Europay, Mastercard, and Visa 
Europay, MasterCard, Visa (abbreviated EMV),in some countries known as "chip 
(i.e. Smartcard) and pin (i.e. a secret code)", is a complex protocol suite and a set of 
stipulations to interact between a credit smart card and a payment terminal. EMV 
cards as an IC card that is used to replace magnetic strip cards, consists of a 
microprocessor which provides transaction‘s security and other capabilities that is 
not possible with magnetic stripe cards [3] and merchant is able to use only one 
terminal for all card brands [4] [5]. The physical aspect of EMV is based on ISO/IEC 
7816 [6].  
An EMV transaction contains four major steps [7]. The first step is reading the 
required data from the card by the terminal to process. For this, terminal asks chip 
card for required data. The next step is to confirmthe authenticity of the card. For 
this, there are three approaches called as Card Authentication Methods (CAM): 
"Static-Data-Authentication" (SDA), "Dynamic-Data-Authentication" (DDA) and 
"Combined-DDA-with-Application-Cryptogram" (CDA). In the rest of this paper we 
describe vulnerabilities of all these approaches. Third step is verification of the 
cardholder via a negotiation between the card and the terminal to choose a possible 
cardholder verification method. In this way, the data element to keep selected 
verification method is called as CVM (Cardholder Verification Method). The usual 
possible approaches to authenticate the cardholder are entering a PIN, cardholder‘s 
signature or nothing at all [6]. The last step is to authorize for the transaction. For 
this, the terminal will confirm that the cardholder has enough balance for current 
transaction [6]. 
In rest of this paper, we describe all types of card authentication methods (CAMs) 
and we mention their vulnerabilities against variant attacks. 
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2.1.1. Static Data Authentication. In EMV, the simplest method to authenticate the 
card is Static Data Authentication. This approach does not provide protection against 
message replay [148]. In fact, this approach does not require a chip card and it is 
possible to do that via a magnetic stripe card without need for a chip card. The 
reason is lack of performing a public key cryptography method in the card side, 
because in this approach, there is only a static application data signed by the issuer 
bank stored into the card [8]. 
In SDA method, the card consists of a static certificate signed by the issuer bank 
to demonstrate that its data is legal. Because of using a static certificate, it is obvious 
to copy it and use it in a counterfeit card including an application which accepts any 
PIN and thus, this type of cards usually called as Yes-card. [9] This type of attack can 
be protected by ―online‖ transactions thanks to contacting the bank by the merchant 
to verify the "Message Authentication Code"of the card. This is performed by a 
common key between the Smartcard and the issuer bank [9]. 
2.1.2. Dynamic Data Authentication. Contrary to SDA, DDA method requires a chip 
card which is capable to perform a public key cryptography algorithm. This method 
needs to generate dynamically a "unique cryptogram" for "each transaction" [8]. In 
this method, each card has of a secret key to confirm its authenticity and on the other 
hand each terminal has the VISA or MasterCard‘s public key, to verify the card‘s 
certificate by using a short certificate chain [10]. In accordance with [6] even in case 
of using DDA approach and offline transaction, it is possible to attack against EMV 
standard.     
2.1.3. Combined DDA with Application Cryptogram. Regarding to this fact that one of the 
main purpose of using smart cards rather than magnetic stripe cards was to be able 
to perform ―secure offline‖ transactions but SDA and even DDA are yet vulnerable 
against some attacks in case of offline transaction. EMV since 2000 added a new 
approach to CAM so-called as Combined DDA with Application Cryptogram 
(abbreviated CDA) in which similar to DDA, the smart card must be capable to 
perform RSA cryptography algorithm [5][136]. In fact, the processing of CDA is 
similar to DDA method but with an additional step in which the card must generate 
the ―second‖ dynamic signature to confirm that the card which is already 
authenticated is used for "current transaction authorization" process to ensure 
security against more sophisticated attacks [8]. In rest of this paper we describe 
vulnerabilities of both DDA and CDA in case of ―offline‖ transactions where EMV 
standard suffers lack of a secure offline authentication approach in CAMs. 
2.2 Attackagainst SDA 
As mentioned, SDA approach is vulnerable against a replay attack in which the 
static certificate is copied and written to a counterfeit card and as a result the card 
responds ―Yes‖ to any entered code, no matter what PIN has been entered and thus 
often called ―Yes-cards‖ [6]. 
In SDA only a symmetric key is used and after PIN verification by the card, the 
terminal sends to the card the transaction data and then the card calculates a MAC 
over this data which called as ―transaction certificate‖. It is not feasible to give all 
terminals this key due to a great risk and possibility of forgery if the key is 
discovered. Thus, the card can prove its authenticity only if the point-of-saleis 
"connected to the bank" [10]. 
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In the other word, in case of offline transactions, SDA smart cards are even less 
secure than magnetic stripe cards, due to no need to know the PIN, since it is mission 
of the card to verify the PIN and the attacker is able to program a counterfeit card to 
verify any PIN [10]. 
2.3  MITM Attackagainst EMV 
In this section we explain the reason of a MITM attack introduced in [6] against DDA 
and CDA CAMs in case of offline transactions.  
Before anything, we describe briefly card holder verification process in which in case 
of correct PIN, the card‘s response is 9000 and otherwise is 63Cx, (x: number of 
PINsentered by client). But the main weak point and flaw in this process is inability 
of the terminal to know who has sent the response of the card [6]. This flaw makes 
plan of a MITM attack. Fig.1 demonstrates this attack. 
 
 
Fig. 1. MITM attack against EMV 
 
 
The authenticated data which is sent to the bank contains "Terminal Verification 
Results" (TVR) and the "Issuer Application Data" (IAD). TVR consists of all possible 
failed card authentication states which are demonstrated in Table I. But one of the 
flaws of this process is that in case of successful authentication, it is not mentioned 
that ―which method‖ has been used (ex. PIN or signature) [6]. 
 
Table I. Terminal Verification Results (TVR) In EMV Standard 
bit Description 
1 Reserved  
2 Reserved  
3 Online PIN entered 
4 PIN is not entered 
5 PIN pad does not work 
6 Number of attempt to enter PIN exceeded 
7 Unrecognized CVM 
8 Cardholder verification was not successful 
Source: Terminal Verification Results (TVR) In 
EMV Standard. 
Note: TVR consists of all possible failed card 
authentication states which are demonstrated in 
Table I. But one of the flaws of this process is that 
in case of successful authentication, it is not 
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mentioned that ―which method‖ has been used. 
 
Thus, an attacker using this flaw is able to perform a MITM attack to intercept the 
connection between the card and the point-of-sale to trick the terminal by sending a 
9000 response, without transferring the PIN to the genuine card and thereby the 
genuine card assumes that the point-of-sale does not have "PIN verification" method 
and uses the signature method to verify the cardholder. On the other hand, because 
the card has not been received the false PIN, the number of attempts to enter the 
PIN (i.e. x) is not increased. As a result, the TVR bits are not set, because there are 
neither attempts nor failure and thereby both the point-of-sale and the card are 
tricked. The point-of-sale believes that the PIN authentication is successful after 
receiving 9000 response and then produces a zero value for TVR, thus the card 
believes the terminal does not support PIN verification method after lack of receiving 
the PIN and so accepts the terminal‘s zero byte.  
2.4 UnpredictableNumber in EMV 
In case of the ATM transactions, the chip card is not involved in authentication 
process, but the ATM encrypts and returns the PIN to the issuer bank. After 
transaction authorisation via ATM network, the ATM transfers to the card some data 
including the unpredictable number (abbreviated UN and usually called as ―nonce‖ 
that is a 32 bit field) to assure the issuer bank that the current transaction is not 
repeated previously and is fresh. In the response, the card returns the "Authorization 
Request Cryptogram" (ARQC), which is a MAC calculated over some data including 
"Application Transaction Counter" (ATC) along with Issuer Application Data (IAD). 
An attack scenario is feasible by replacing this UN value, introduced in [11] so-called 
as Pre-Play attack.  
The attacker first saves an ARQC using a POS which is infested with a malware. 
This ARQC is related to nonce N. Then the attacker (in another transaction with an 
ATM) transfers it to the ATM that generated another nonce i.e. N´. The ATM 
transfers the ARQC and N´ to the issuer bank (unrelated together). Finally, the 
attacker by using a MITM device replaces N´ with N and so the transaction is 
accepted by the issuer bank [11]. Fig.2 demonstrates Pre-play attack. 
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Fig. 2. Pre-Play attack against EMV 
2.5Relay Attack against EMV 
Despite the smart card is a tamper resistant device and also convenient to carry, but 
it suffers a trusted user interface. In the other word, it lacks an input/output to 
communicate with the cardholder. Lack of an input to enter the PIN directly causes 
possibility of eavesdropping between keypad and the card. On the other hand, lack of 
a trusted display leads to inability to confirm the real amount of the transaction and 
also no information about who is in the other side of the communication which 
consequently leads to possibility of relay of the data to another place [12].  
In accordance with [12], for such this attack, there are some variant approaches to 
eavesdropping the POS terminal: such as Camera and Double-swipe, Hacked 
Terminal, Counterfeit Terminal and Terminal Skimmer. 
3. ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY (ECC) IN EMV SMART CARDS 
According to EMV consortium decision, the current RSA based cryptosystem will be 
replaced by an "Elliptic Curve cryptography system" [149], also the use of both RSA 
and ECDSA is proposed [150]. A specification for ECC is accessible in [151] which 
specifies the use of EC-DSA and EC-IES for signatures andencryption, respectively. 
In another announcement [152], EC-Schnorr is under consideration (which 
minimizes amount of the computation needed for the signature generation for the 
smart card that is important due to the limitation in the computational power of the 
smart cards processors [153]). A main purpose for the migration to ECC is limitation 
of the current RSA based EMV in size of public keys that is not possible to be larger 
than 1984 bits [154].  
The differences between public key cryptosystems are found in several parameters 
[150]. The classical public key cryptosystems are based on inequality of performing a 
calculation against solving the inverse, like RSA (shorted for Rivest, Shamir, 
Adleman) that is "multiplication"vs."factorisation" [155] or 
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"exponentiation"vs."discrete logarithms" which is used in Diffie-Hellman[156]and 
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)[157].  
The RSA is on the basis of factoring larger integers, whereas the ECC-based 
cryptosystem is on the basis of discrete logarithms (DL) in the groups of elliptic curve 
[158].  
The fastest known classical efficient factorization algorithm to break RSA is number 
field sieve that runs in subexponential time [159] [150] but in case of elliptic curve the 
fastest algorithm for breaking the "Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem" 
(abbreviate ECDLP) is ―Pollard’s rho algorithm” that runs in exponential time and 
consequently, by using ECDSA, it is possible to achieve the same level of security of 
RSA but with smaller keys and parameters [150].  
Thus, in EMV standard, ECDSA could be an alternative to RSA for reducing both 
―memory requirement‖ and ―computation power‖ such that the smart card does not 
need a co-processor to perform a signing operation. The main difference between RSA 
and ECDSA signatures is that ECDSA uses a signature with appendix (where the 
signature is usually appended to the unmodified message), whereas RSA signature 
uses message recovery approach (where all or some of the message is embedded in the 
signature) [150].  
In EMV, For the PIN encryption, Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme 
(abbreviated ECIES) could be used that uses Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman 
(abbreviated EC-DH) as a Key Agreement function to generate a key between the 
card and the terminal along with a symmetric methodlike 3-DES, AES or XOR to 
encrypt the PIN [150].  
The main advantage of ECC based cryptosystems is possibility of providing the 
security level of RSA but with notably shorter key that is advantageous for the 
implementation based on the smart card [160].  
In accordance with [161], Table II demonstrates size of key in RSA and ECC to 
provide same level of security. The sizes are in bits. For example, the security level of 
80 bits means the best algorithm to break the encrypted messageneedsaround2
80
  
steps.  
A problem with Public Key Cryptosystems implementation in smart cards is the 
power of the computation by the smart card processor, where the transaction speed 
under 100 milliseconds is desired [162] which by using RSA cryptosystem [155] is too 
long because of numerous operations over large modulus and even in case of using 
ECC based cryptosystems which is around 10 times faster than RSA [162] and uses 
smaller key sizes [163] [164], is not still fast enough. 
 
 
Table II.  The security level of 80 bits means the best algorithm to break the encrypted message needs 
around2
80
  steps 
Security level (bit) 80 112 128 192 256 
ECC Key Size (bit) 160 224 256 384 512 
RSA Key Size (bit) 1024 2048 3072 8192 15360 
 
    
4. CARD-NOT-PRESENT TRANSACTIONS 
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CNP (as the name describes) implies on transactions without presenting the card to 
the merchant and usually performed via internet or telephone. Because of lack of a 
physical POS terminal in this type of transactions, there is no standard process to 
authenticate the cardholder [14] and this is the main challenge issue concerning the 
security of CNP transaction.  
Despite all of weaknesses of security issues in CNP transactions, the CNP fraud is 
only ―one‖ of the several fraud types. The other frauds are classified as: ―First-party 
fraud‖, ―Counterfeit fraud‖, ―Lost and stolen card fraud‖, ―Mail and non-receipt 
fraud‖ and ―ID theft‖ [13].  
CNP is divided into two major approaches: The first approach is EMV based protocols 
which customer at time of transaction need to have his card. The authentication of 
this type of protocols so-called Two-factor authentication i.e. smart card and 
password such as SET/EMV and EMV/CAP. In the second approach the customer 
does not need to have his card at time of transaction, such as 3D SET and 3D SSL 
(commonly called as 3D Secure and originally branded as ―Verified-by-Visa‖ or 
―MasterCard-Secure-Code‖). In the rest of paper, we describe these protocols. 
4.13D Secure ("Verified-by-Visa" or "MasterCard-Secure-Code") 
The banks largely are interesting to start online authentications of the cards by 
using the ‗3D Secure‘ protocol [125]. In accordance with [125] 3D Secure despite poor 
technology, is interested by the banks and the merchants.  
CNP transactions are performed via the internet, phone or the post in absence of a 
physical POS terminal in the same location of the card and cardholder; thereby it 
leads to be a large proportion of the bank losses. Despite reducing frauds by 
counterfeit cards by replacing the smart cards instead of magnetic stripe cards, but 
the CNP frauds has been increased significantly [125]. The countermeasure of the 
industry to this type of frauds is 3D Secure [126]. In the rest of this paper we 
overview this protocol.  
4.1.13D Secure Overview.In our review, we focus on Verified by Visa named Visa 3D 
Secure. The Visa 3D Secure structure is a centralized model including the Directory 
Servers (DS) which is central point to send the cardholder information between the 
issuer bank server (Access Control Server (ACS)) and the merchant which leads to 
raising both number messages and complexity [127]. To protect the cardholder 
against spoofing attacks, 3D Secure uses a "Personal-Assurance-Message" (PAM) 
represented by the issuing bank at time of cardholder authentication [127]. Fig.3 
demonstrates "3D-Secure-Verified-by-Visa" Steps. As "Visa-3D-Secure" architecture 
is demonstrated in Fig.3, twelve messages are exchanged between four parties.  We 
mention its steps briefly: In the first step, the cardholder sends the request to the 
merchant by using card information. Then the merchant website forwards the 
cardholder information to the Visa Directory Server (DS). The DS after 
authentication of the merchant by using either certificate or password contacts the 
issuer bank regarding to the account number and then forwards the message to the 
merchant website to confirm the hard holder enrolment.  After verification by ACS 
an acknowledgement along with a URL is transferred to the merchant. The DS sends 
the data back to the merchant. After, the merchant transfersthepayment 
authorisation(needed for the ACS) via the cardholder browser. The ACS displays the 
PAM to assure the cardholder and then request for authentication information from 
the cardholder. The ACS after receiving and verifying the cardholder information 
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sends its response to the merchant via the cardholder‘s browser. Finally, the 
merchant creates the cardholder‘s receipt and transfers a token to the acquirer bank 
for settling. 
 
Fig. 3. 3D Secure Verified by Visa Steps (VReq: Verify enrolment Request, VRes: Verify enrolment 
Response, CPaReq: Condensed PayementAuthorisation Request, PaTranReq: Payment Authorization 
Transaction Requst, PaTranRes: Payment Authorization Transaction Response, CPaRes: Condensed 
PayementAuthorisation Response) 
4.1.2. 3D Secure Vulnarebility. At the begging, 3D Secure using a pop-up form would 
attempt to get the cardholder‘s password. But because of the difficulties with the pop-
up blockers, it was replaced with inline-frames (abbreviated iFrame) [125]. As a 
result, because of using an iFrame form without an address bar to receive the 
cardholder‘s password, a customer will not be able to verify who is asking for the 
password. On the other hand, we should consider that most people do not have 
enough knowledge about ―SSL sign‖, on the web browser.  
 
4.2   Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) 
The second approach to provide the security of the online payment over the open 
networks is SET protocol (Secure Electronic Transaction), implemented for personal 
computers which is as the pint-of-sale. The SET specification has been published 
publicly for the industry [129].  
In practice, SET could not succeed in comparison with 3D Secure. In accordance with 
[128] the two main reasons for this are related to both the customers and the 
merchants. The first reason is complexity of SET wallet installation and downloading 
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the certificate for consumers and the second one is expensiveness of both the software 
and the hardware for the merchants.   
To protect the payment process, SET uses symmetric and asymmetric approaches 
and also key management process is based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [130] 
[131].  
The 3D SET means adapting the SET protocol with the concept of Three Domain 
(abbreviated 3D) by implementing SET Wallet Server to let the issuer bank to make 
the transaction on the side of thecustomer which means that the issuing bank 
becomes the host of "SET-Wallet-Server" [128]. 
4.2.1. "SET-Wallet-Server" Solution Steps. "SET-Wallet-Server" solution‘ steps are as 
follow: Selecting the SET as payment approach by the cardholder and then sending a 
"SET-wake-up" message to the customer by the issuer bank and redirecting this 
message to the "SET-Wallet-Server" by the cardholder‘s browser and thereafter, 
receiving and verifying the cardholder‘s secret authentication code and finally 
performing the transaction on behalf of the customer by the issuing bank [128].   
4.2.2. SET Advantages. In this section we mention the advantages of SET protocol. 
In accordance with [132] the SET assure the confidentiality of the cardholder‘s 
information during the transmission and the storage, by preventing the merchant to 
be able to see the cardholder‘s information via encrypting the data using the 
acquirer‘s public key and also, assuring the merchant‘s privacy by preventing the 
acquirer bank to learn the cardholder‘s order details which is stored in the 
merchant‘s server.    
4.2.3. SET Weaknesses. Some of main disadvantages of the SET is the cost of 
implementation that is more expensive and more complicated than SSL/TLS. Also, it 
is not permitted to place an order to a computer on which the SET requirements has 
not been installed, because of conducting the SET transaction by cardholder‘s private 
key that is stored in the cardholder‘s SET-initialised computer. Another weakness of 
SET is related to its performance that may lead to unacceptable transaction speed 
[132]. In the following sections, we describe EMV based CNP transactions i.e. 
SET/EMV, EMV/CAP. This type of CNP protocols use two-factor authentication 
including both EMV smart cards and password.  
4.3   SET/EMV 
One of the solutions to simplify the SET registration is to integrate the SET with 
EMV to provide more extensive use of SET in internet payments [4]. The other 
advantage of this approach is enhancing the security by using a two-factor 
authentication. 
4.3.1. SET and EMV Adoption. Sharing a number of features by both protocols may 
lead to possibility of integration. The main purpose of introducing both SET and 
EMV is reducing the credit cards frauds, although in different types of Card-not-
present and Card-present transactions, respectively. On the other hand, both SET 
and EMV use a hierarchical PKI architecture, such that the credit card brands sign 
the certificates for the banks and the banks sign the certificates for both the 
cardholders and the merchants. Another common feature between two protocols is to 
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enter a PIN for the cardholder verification process before performing a transaction 
[4].  
4.3.2. SET/EMV Analysis. There are two main problems concerning traditional SET, 
including the necessity of the customer to register for a certificate to perform any 
transaction. Also to initiate the SET, the cardholder needs to activate the stored 
private key at his computer. The other problem is vulnerability and the risk of 
accessibility of the cardholder's private key at his computer. Whereas, in case of 
SET/EMV, using an existing key pair and a stored private key in the EMV smart 
card leads to avoiding the necessity of initial enrollment and also decreasing the 
probability of revealing the private key [133]. SET/EMV has some advantages for the 
cardholder: for example, difficulty for stealing or revealing the cardholder‘s financial 
information. By using the EMV smart card, the cardholder‘s private key is protected 
by the smartcard physical security features. Also, it leads to inability of the merchant 
to access the payment data, thanks to verification of the merchant by the acquirer 
bank and signing and encrypting the payment information by using the cardholder‘s 
private key and acquirer‘s public key, respectively [133]. Also, there are some 
benefits for the merchant: For example, ensuring the cardholder verification by 
entering the PIN to the EMV smart card via cardholder‘s computer. On the other 
hand, the merchant is not reliable against the disputed transaction, thanks to 
conformity of the SET model with face-to-face traditional transactions (i.e. CP 
transactions) and also ensuring that nobody is able to access to the cardholder‘s order 
information even the acquirer bank which leads to preserving the merchant privacy 
[133]. In the other side, requiring an additional device that is IC card reader causes 
that SET/EMV becomes a little complicated for the consumers [143] and also e-
consumers prefer not to spend more money to buy an extra device only for performing 
some e-commerce transactions [144].  
4.4   Chip Authentication Program: EMV/CAP 
The purpose of creating the Chip Authentication Programme (abbreviated 
EMV/CAP), was to reduce the losses arising from the online payments frauds [134]. 
The EMV/CAP specifications is not published publicly and it leads to lack of a public 
security examination. However, a reverse engineering has been done [134] and some 
useful information is leaked. According to this information, some ambiguities is 
revealed concerning transactions process and transferring zero amount [135]. 
EMV/CAP uses a card reader along with a credit Smart Card to create the "one-time 
codes" for both transaction authentication and login [134].  
According to reverse engineering introduced in [134], the EMV/CAP is performed in 
three modes including: identify (which returns a one-time code), respond (which 
requires a get change process) and sign (which requires an account number). The 
"response code" is a MAC calculated over the cardholder‘s information, plus a 
"transaction counter" and a flag to show if the PIN is matched. Performing each mode 
is required entering a PIN by the cardholder. The Fig.4 demonstrates a response 
transaction [134]. The transaction details which are shown to the user are not signed 
by the EMV smart card which causes the protocol to be more vulnerable against some 
type of attacks [137].  
The EMV/CAP is similar to EMV traditional transaction. During a transaction, two 
"Application Cryptograms" are generated by the EMV smart card. The first one is 
called as Authorization Request Cryptogram (abbreviated ARQC) to authorize the 
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online transaction and the second one is called as "Application Authentication 
Cryptogram" (abbreviated AAC) to terminate properly the transaction. The 
cryptograms have not been signed by an asymmetric algorithm, but they are 
"Message Authentication Codes" which are createdbya symmetric key between the 
issuer and EMV smart card [135]. 
 
Fig. 4. EMV/CAP Steps Reverse Engineered by [134] 
5. TOKENIZATION 
The concept of Tokenization was introduced in 2013 by three credit card brands (i.e. 
―MasterCard‖, ―Visa‖ and ―American Express‖) to enhance the user‘s confidentiality 
and privacy in the online transactions. The concept is to replace the "Primary 
Account Number" (abbreviated PAN) with a digital value named as the ―token‖ to 
assure the privacy of the cardholder‘s sensitive information. The additional steps to 
the traditional transactions are requesting and providing a token and thereafter, the 
cardholder will use this token instead the PAN during the transaction. In the other 
hand, the merchants and the digital wallet operators no longer need to store the PAN 
as a sensitive data and this adds an additional security layer to the online 
transactions [14] [15].  
The proposed concept need to have the following key features: [15]  
• Providing the more complete information concerning the transaction by using 
new data fields to improve the fraud detection and accelerate the permission and 
authorization process. 
• Reliable approaches to verify the cardholder, before replacing the PAN with 
the token.  
• Designing a standard to achieve the simplification of the transaction process 
for the merchants in any type of payments such as contactless, online payment etc.  
On the other hand, the token generation also needs to have some properties:  
• Ensuring the acceptability of the token largely as a substitute value of the 
traditional Primary Account Number 
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• Ability of the all current e-payment participants to perform a transaction 
using the token.  
• Ensuring the feasibility to develop secure innovative e-payment products and 
applications comfortably.  
• Enhancing the cardholder security and confidentiality at time of using the 
PAN in unreliable environments 
6. BLIND SIGNATURES SCHEMES IN E-PAYMENT 
The ―blind signature‖ and also the ―group signature‖ are the popular approaches for 
implementation of the e-payment systems [30].  
The ―Blind signature‖proposed by David Chaum [31] is a type of ―digital signature‖ in 
cryptography in which the message has been changed (or blinded) before signing. The 
Blind signature is often used in a protocol where the privacy is a major key, such that 
the signer is able to learn ―neither the message nor the resulting signature‖ and 
because of this feature it is capable to be used for realizing the protocols which 
provide the anonymity of participants [31][32].  
The key property of a cash is anonymity of the customer, which means if the 
customer takes some money, the bank has no knowledge about what the customer 
buys and when spends the money, on the other hands, the merchant has no 
information about who the customer is [33].  
But in online payment, the cardholder has to submit his personal information to the 
merchant and on the other hand, needs to inform the credit card‘s company about the 
merchant. As a result, the potential of the ignoring the cardholder‘s privacy is higher 
[33].  
In accordance with [33], the blind signature provides the anonymity of the cardholder 
with following scenario:  
The cardholder to withdraw some money from his account creates a coin so-called as 
C and generates its hash value by using a public hash function called f(C) and then 
encrypts the hash value by using 𝐸𝐶(f(C)). The bank signs encrypted value by using 
𝑆𝑏 (E(f(C))) and debits the cardholder‘s bank account. The cardholder then computes 
𝐷𝐶(𝑆𝑏 (𝐸𝐶(f(C)))) to decrypt himself encryption to learn 𝑆𝑏 (f(C)). Then he makes sure 
that 𝑆𝑉(𝑆𝑏 (f(C))) = f(C) to verify signature of the bank. To spend his electronic cash, he 
gives both 𝑆𝑏 (f(C)) (as the bank‘s signature) and C (i.e. coin) to the merchant and then 
the merchant sends these to the bank. The bank after checking the validity of the 
signature, pays the merchant (the cardholder‘s C) and finally marks the coin C as 
already been spent. 
So, in this way, the cardholder‘s anonymity has been preserved and the bank is able 
to detect the double-spending, but because of preserving the cardholder‘s anonymity, 
cannot punish the double-spender.  
Chaum in [34] and [35] has introduced unconditionally untraceable electronic 
payment using the RSA digital signature scheme. The authors in [36] have used alike 
idea to provide an electronic-cash protocol which preserves the customer‘s anonymity 
until he does not perform a fraudulent transaction and as a penalty the customer‘s 
identity will be revealed. In this proposed model, because of using digital signatures, 
the customer‘s frame-up is protected only computationally and not unconditionally. 
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However, the customer‘s privacy is protected unconditionally. In scheme of [36], the 
bank does not know where the money has been spent and how much is the individual 
transaction amount. Authors in [37] introduce a new primitive called as restrictive 
blind signature to provide untraceable off-line cash in wallets. Authors in [38] 
present an anonymous payment system with reducing the size of the databases. 
Authors in [39] presentan off-line electronic check schemes in which the withdrawal 
and the payment of the check are certainly unlikable, but in the event of double-
spending, the customer‘s ID will be disclosed with high probability. Authors in [40] 
introduce an untraceable universal electronic cash to solve the problems intrinsic to 
the real cash in which the customer is able to subdivide his cash balance into some 
partssuch that the sum of all subdivided parts is equal to his global cash.  
A "blind signature"includestwo entities and without a trusted third party: the sender 
of message to sign along withthe signer which permits the sender receives a signed 
message without revealing the message and the signature to realize the anonymity of 
customer (i.e. sender) [41].  
Several proposal has been introduced to realize the blind signatures such as [43] [44] 
[45]. However, all of them provide ―full‖ unlinkability which means impossibility for 
signer to link a ―message-signature pair‖ to the related signing protocol. This 
anonymity leads to the possibility of misusing. Typically, in an anonymous e-cash the 
blind signature causes preventing to link the withdrawal and the payment which is 
made by the same sender (i.e. customer), a property which leads to possibility of the 
blackmailing or money laundering [41] [42]. Even in case of small transactions, it 
would be possible to perform several transactions with the small values and 
consequently transferring the total value of transactions anonymously. As a result, it 
could be helpful to remove the anonymity property by using a third trusted party 
when it is necessary for a legitimate reason to prevent such these abuses [41]. 
6.1   Fair Blind Signatures Schemes in E-Payment 
Since the blind signature‘s properties provide fullunlinkability, it may be helpful 
widely for untraceable e-cash [46] [37]. However, such these systems might be 
misused, such as money laundering or blackmailing [41] [47].  
In accordance with [41] a novel scheme of "blind signature" has been introduced 
named "fair blind signature". Such a scheme of "blind signature"includes ―several 
senders‖ (as the customer), a ―signer‖ (as the bank) and an additional third trusted 
entity (called as the judge) along with two protocols: a signing protocol and a link-
recovery protocol. The additional trusted entity (i.e. judge) delivers the necessary 
information which allows the signer could be able to derive a link between the 
"message-signature pair" and the signature protocol if it would be required for a legal 
reason when the unlinkability property is abused. The signing protocol lets the 
sender receives a message signed by the signer, such that the signer is not able to 
link "his view of the protocol" to the "message-signature pair" and the "link-recovery 
protocol" lets the signer to obtain necessary data via the judge entity. The authors in 
[41] introduce two different type of fair blind signatures: In the first type, the "link-
recovery protocol"permits the signer to determine the related "message-signature 
pair" and thereby the bank is able to determine the doubtful destination, whereas the 
second type allows the signer to determine the sender of the message and 
consequently the bank is able to determine the origin of the doubtful money. Fig.5 
demonstrates these two schemes. 
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Fig. 5. Fair blind signature scheme introduced in [41] Type 1 : The "link-recovery protocol" permits the 
signer to determine the related "message-signature pair" and thereby the bank is able to determine the 
doubtful destination, Type 2 : The link-recovery protocol allows the signer to determine the sender of the 
message and consequently the bank is able to determine the origin of the doubtful money. 
Thus, by using electronic system on the basis of a "fair blind signature", performing 
the ―anonymous payment‖ is yet possible, but it is possible to remove the ―anonymity‖ 
by using a trusted entity which does not need to be involved in the transaction itself 
[48]. 
6.2   Group Blind Signatures Schemes in E-Payment 
The group signature permits signing a message by the members on the side of the 
group without demonstrating the signer information and the only entity which is 
able to designate the signer information is manager of group [49].  
The concept of the "group signature" is introduced in [50] and improvement of the 
solution is presented in [51], [52] and [53]. Contrary to all these solutions which have 
two main unpleasant properties including dependency of the public key size of group 
on the number of group‘s member which leads to be problematic in case of large 
group and also need for modifying the public key in case of adding a new member, in 
the scheme presented by [49] the group manager is able to add new members without 
modifying the public key.  
In Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) a practical group blind signature has 
been introduced in [54] which combines existing notions of both "blind signatures" 
and "group signatures". This model adds the blindness property to the "group 
signature" scheme which is introduced by Camenisch and Stadler in [49]. In 
accordance with [54] more than one bank can give out"anonymous" and 
"untraceable"e-cash securely with remaining the issuer‘s ID concealed. Also, similar 
to [49] the ―space‖ and ―communication‖ complexity of the activitiesare not depending 
on the group size. 
However, the classical ―group signatures‖ and ―blind signatures‖ are on the basis of 
the computation complexity, e.g. ―factorization, discrete logarithm‖ or ―quadratic 
residue problems‖ which cannot provide unconditional security [30] [55]. 
7. QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY IN E-PAYMENT 
In this section, we try to explain the roll of the "Quantum Key Distribution" 
(abbreviated QKD) in electronic payment systems to achieve unconditional security 
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rather than only computational security which is depends on the attacker‘s 
computational power. In this way, we mention some innovations in combination of 
QKD with electronic payment to learn an advanced security. The first approach is 
use of QKD in smart card (as a hand-held device) and the second one is a protocol 
based on QKD to improve the security between two banks.  
"Quantum Key Distribution" (abbreviated QKD) is a key distribution approach to 
generate a secret key over an unconfident channel. Then the secret shared key usable 
for encryption over any "insecure classical channel". QKD is depended on the 
quantum physics laws to realize ―unconditional security‖ [16-22]. 
7.1   Quantum Fair Blind Signatures in E-Payment 
The "quantum fair blind signature" introduced by [32] includes four steps: 
"initializing", "signing", "verifying" and "link-recovery" along with three default fair 
blind signature entities i.e. a "signer", a "trusted entity" and "several senders". In 
accordance with [32] a "fair blind signature" must include several attributes that are 
unforgeability, undeniability, verifiability, blindness and traceability. A secure 
quantum fair blind signature must be able to ensure that nobody can generate a 
signature except either the signer or the trusted entity. However, authors in [16] 
show the possibility of the counterfeiting a valid signature by a sender via 
intercepting a signature in this scheme.  
Despite many researches on "quantum signatures", [56-59] the research on use of the 
QKD in electronic payment is not still satisfactory [30].  
One of the attempts in this domain has been introduced in [30] that we describe it in 
the following section.  
The authors in [60] introduce an e-cash protocolon the basis of both techniques of 
"Quantum blind signature" and "one-time pad" to guaranty the "unconditional 
security" in electronic payment system. Authors in [61] introduce another e-cash 
protocol on the basis of"quantum blind signatures" and "group signatures" along with 
two trusted parties rather than one for enhancing robustness of the system. 
However, both these systems have a limitation in real life that is possibility of the 
performing transactions only within the same bank. The Authors in [30] introduce an 
electronic payment protocol based on "one-time" pad and "quantum proxy blind 
signature" to solve this problem, allowing supporting the secure transactions 
between two different banks. The reason for use of proxy signature is that the issuer 
bank after deducting the money, delegates the blind signature to the merchant‘s 
bank [30]. 
7.2   Compact Quantum Key Distribution in E-Payment 
Unlike the "classical cryptography" in which the security is relied on the inability to 
solve a certain mathematical problem in a feasible runtime, the QKD security is 
based on the quantum physics laws and thereby existence of any eavesdropping and 
intercepting the quantum communication will be detected by two legitimate parties 
and as a result, finally a secret key securely will be shared between two parties. The 
most well-known QKD protocol is the first one called as Bennett-Brassard-84 (BB84) 
created in 1984 [23]. Here we describe the protocol briefly.  
At the beginning, the first party transfers a random sequence of photons which are 
polarized randomly in four states (including the degrees of 0, 45, 90, 135), without 
informing the second party. Then these photons are measured randomly by the 
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second party based on the either rectilinear or diagonal without informing the first 
party after calculation of the quantum transmission, the second party makes public 
both the received photons and the measurement basis over a classical channel 
without the actual results. The first party determines the correct measurement basis 
and then both parties discard the others. If both parties use the degrees of 0 and 45 
to demonstrate the value of 0 and the degrees of 90 and 135 to demonstrate the value 
of 1, as a result, the random string will be the shared key between two parties. If the 
achieved result by two parties is not the same, it means that there is an 
eavesdropping over the channel and consequently, they retry to generate another key 
until achieving a secured shared key without any eavesdropping [24]. Existing an 
eavesdropper over the channel will be determined by measuring the error rate when 
exceeding a threshold [25] [24].The idea proposed in [26] is a free space QKD system 
to use the QKD approach based on BB84 protocol along with use of One-Time Pad 
(abbreviated OTP) cryptography to communicate a "hand-held electronic device"like a 
Smartcard or mobile phone with an ATM by using free space optics. 
QKD provides a new way for two communication parties to achieve a shared secret 
key over a long distance. The main advantage is the unconditional security. Since 
introducing the QKD, it has been progressed quickly in comparison with the original 
QKD protocol [26][27][23].   
The idea proposed in [24] uses the compact QKD approach to protect the interface 
between the Automated Teller Machine (abbreviated ATM) and the customer‘s hand-
held device (e.g. cardholder‘s smart card) for achieving the impossibility of any 
eavesdropping to learn the key information via the skimming attacks called as ―false 
front‖ on the ATM by which both the key and the card information are revealed [24]. 
The cardholder‘s module is combined in a "hand-held" secure device"like a Smartcard 
and the other module is combined in an ATM. The customer first must register in the 
issuer bank and after registration, the cardholder receives a smart card which 
consists of a unique secret string as a One-Time Pad shared with a central server 
connected to the all ATMs to authenticate and encrypt the further transactions 
either at the time of withdrawing from an ATM or performing an online transaction. 
The cardholder must renew periodically this secret shared as OTP [24].  
A One-Time Pad (OTP) is a cryptographic protocol in which both parties have an 
associated random variables, as the ―key‖, which are not related with any variables 
owned by an eavesdropper [28][29]. In case of use of one-time key variables, the both 
parties can transfer a secret message over an insure channel [28]. 
8. ELECTRONIC CURRENCY AND PEER TO PEER PAYMENT SYSTEMS 
Bitcoin was introduced as a pure peer to peer [112] electronic currency or 
cryptocurrency [113] to aim at fully decentralizing [114] electronic payment 
transactions, allowing to perform online payment transactions directly from one 
party to another one ―without‖ interference of a financial institution as a ―trusted 
third party‖ [112]. It uses digital signature to verify the bitcoin‘spossession and 
employs Blockchain to stop ―double-spending‖ [116].  
Blockchain is broadcasted via a "peer to peer" network to achieve a consensus about 
the history of transactions via a proof-of-work system [118][119][116] which means 
need for verification of a "majority of computational power" which is performed by 
―honest parties‖who follow the protocol as described [120]. In fact, the public logs 
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leads to achieving transparency for satisfying the trust of the users, but it has also 
some negative effects on the privacy and anonymity of the users [121].  
Due to publishing transaction logs fully publicly, the user‘s anonymity is protected 
only via use of pseudonyms addresses [123].  
In accordance with [122] bitcoin provide a weak anonymity due to using 
pseudonymous addresses which usually causes that the user‘s transactions may be 
simply linked together and also in case of linking one user‘s transactions to his 
identity, all of user‘s transactions could be revealed.   
The user‘s privacy in electronic transactions comes back to Chaum‘s proposal about 
―anonymous‖e-cashbyusing the ―blind signatures‖ [122]. However, because of the 
natural property of the traditional electronic payment i.e. need for a central trusted 
party (commonly a financial institution or bank), the anonymity has not been still 
seen a ―widespread consensus‖ [122]. According to [123], a main problem of electronic 
cash protocols is relying on a trusted currency issuer.  
One of the main problem of using financial institutions as a trusted third party to 
perform electronic payments transactions is impossibility of a perfect non-reversible 
transaction, because financial institutions cannot avoid mediating disputes that is 
the intrinsic problem of the trust based model and to improve this problem, bitcoin 
uses cryptographic proof based model trust based [112].  
We mention here briefly some most important attempts concerning electronic 
currency and peer to peer electronic payment systems: Ripple [106] is an electronic 
currency such that all users are able to issue a currency but it will be accepted only 
by the peers who has reliance on the issuer and also the acceptance of the transaction 
needs for a chain of trusted mediators between sender and receiver. i-WAT [107] is 
another similar system where the chain of trusted mediators is initiated using digital 
signatures. KARMA [108] was introduced as another electronic currency in which 
central authority is including a set of users who manage all transactions that in the 
event of numerous transactions leads to the overhead. PPay [109] is a "peer to 
peer"network in which the coin issuer has responsibility of keeping track of the 
transaction. However, it has the same problem of KARMA concerning the overhead. 
Mondex as smart card electronic currency [110] is similar to an issuer bank for 
currency issuance that stores the value as electronic information on a smart card 
instead of the physical notes and coins [111].  
Bitcoin is introduced as an "electronic coin" which works as a sequence of "digital 
signatures" where ownerssendbitcoin to the succeeding party after adding to the end 
of bitcoin his signature (generated by his private key) along with the hash of 
preceding transaction along with public key of the succeeding owner (i.e. receiver) 
and as a result, the final receiver (i.e. the merchant or the payee) is able to verify the 
ownership‘s chain by verifying the signatures [112].  
However, the remained problem is inability to determine performing ―double-
spending‖ via one of the owners in the chain. To avoid using trusted central authority 
such as the coin issuer, all transactions must be announced publicly [115] to achieve 
an agreement on a ―unique‖ history of the transaction by all participants [112]. To 
avoid double-spending, the final receiver (i.e. merchant) needs to receive the majority 
of nodes agreed that it was first received [112].  
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The history of transaction as a public log is called as blockchain which is maintained, 
recorded and run by a group of minerswho are rewarded regarding to their 
participation in the bitcoin network [113].  
The authors in [113] introduces an attack to demonstrate the bitcoin is not an 
―incentive-compatible‖ protocol which means possibility of miners colluding (called as 
selfish miners) to learn a reward larger than their fair share. Consequently, the 
"rational"(or selfish) miners would rather cooperate with the ―selfish miners‖. As a 
result, the size of this colluding group will be increased until converting to a 
majority. Since, the bitcoinnetwork needs a majority of honest miners who perform 
exactly the prescribed protocol, if a colluding group is able to become a majority as a 
result, it can e.g. prevent some transactions [113] or decide to reject originated coins 
belonging to a particular address leading to devalue of their coins and thereby other 
users become disinclined to use these coins for the payment [114].  
In the other word, the decisions need to be accepted via majority of the computational 
power that by default is supposed to be honest [114]. In fact, the users vote according 
to their computing power to prevent double-spending. This action beneficially 
restricts the power of a specific group of users and leads to performing Sybil attack 
(i.e. forging different IDs in a ―peer to peer‖networkto reduce redundancy) [114] 
[117].  
However, [114] demonstrates some critical decisions in the bitcoin‘s network which 
may be controlled by a small set of entities, despite controlling enormous computing 
power in the system. On the other hand, some actions such as protocol updates are 
not considered to be decentralized, but they are managed by limited entities as 
administrators without respecting the ―computing power‖ that they control, but 
depending on their ―function‖ or ―duty‖ in the network. Authors in [114] introduce a 
suggestions to enhance the decentralization of bitcoin, e.g. reducing the impact of 
mining pools on the bitcoin system.  
In accordance with [122], Mixing services exchange the user‘s coins arbitrarily with 
other users‘ coins after taking them to make unclear the ownership, but without 
protection from theft by the service (i.e. Mixing services).  
The authors in [122] introduce a Mixcoin, fully compatible with bitcoin that adds an 
accountable service (called as Mixes) to determine the theft of service, means the 
―accountable‖ mixes sign warranties to users such that if a user send n coins to Mixes 
until time of t1, the Mixes have to return n coins to this user by time t2. As a result, 
in case of misbehaving a Mix, the user can devalue the reputation of the Mix by 
publishing Mix‘s warranty.  
Another attempt to enhance the anonymity of bitcoin has been introduced in [123] as 
Zerocoin as a cryptographic extension of bitcoin which despite providing strong 
anonymity by using unlinking transactions from source of the payment, [124] but an 
advanced cryptography and considerable changes is needed to be compatible with 
bitcoin [122]. However, in accordance with [124] it reveals yet the payment 
destinations along with the transaction amount.  
The authors in [124] introduce the concept of Decentralized Anonymous Payment 
(abbreviated DAP) by which a user is able to pay privately another one, in which the 
transaction does not reveal the sender of payment, destination and the transaction 
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amount. DAP scheme is used in Zerocash as a decentralized anonymous payment 
system [124]. 
9. NEAR FIELD COMMUNICATION (NFC) 
―Near Field Communication‖ (abbreviated NFC) was introduced in 2002 for 
contactless payments [62], as a "short range" and "half-duplex communication", 
allowing the signal transmission in both directions, but not simultaneously to provide 
communication between various devices [63]. The communication takes place 
between two transmitter and receiver devices within few centimetres (about 10 cm 
(typically less) [68]) and with 13.56 MHz operating frequency [64-66][62]. The more 
details concerning specifications of NFC is found in ISO 18092 [86].  
The NFC devices types is classified as ―initiator‖ to initiate and guide the data 
exchange and ―target‖ to respond to the request of initiator device. Also, NFC 
communication consists of two modes: ―active‖ mode in which both "initiator" and 
"target" use own energy to transmit the data, whereas in ―passive‖ mode the target 
device uses the energy which is generated by the initiator device [67-68].  
In card simulation operating mode, NFC devices employ alike protocols of the 
Smartcards and are entirely well suited with the standards on the basis of ISO/IEC 
14443 including "Type A", "Type B" and "FeliCa" [69].  
After the NFC phone is approximated to a reader, the NFC phone treats similar to a 
Smartcard and the reader communicates with the software of the Secure Element 
(abbreviated SE) which performs the actions that need high security. The Secure 
Element is a chipembedded into the phone to provide the security like a Smartcard 
[70]. 
9.1   NFC Vulnerabilities 
Due to the nature of NFC that is a "wireless communication interface", evidently the 
eavesdropping is one the principal challenges. An attacker will be able trying to 
extract and decode the data after receiving the Radio Frequency signals either 
experimentally or by research. According to [68] in case of the data transmitting in 
active mode, it is feasible to eavesdrop up to 10 m, but in case of passive mode, the 
distance will be reduced until 1 m. In case of eavesdropping, it is possible also to 
corrupt the data and disturb the communication such that the receiver cannot detect 
the attacker sender device [68]. In a DoS attack, the adversary can perform a data 
corruption by transferring the valid data at a correct time which could be calculated 
by learning the type of the "modulation" and "coding". However, the attacker cannot 
modify the actual data. However, NFC phone can detect this type of attack thanks to 
verify the Radio Frequency field, at time of transferring data. In accordance with [68] 
the energy consumption of data corruption is notably more than the attack detection. 
According to [68] data modification is different with data corruption and its 
feasibility is depended on the amplitude modulation that is used.  
The "NFC Data Exchange Format" (abbreviated "NDEF") is used for exchanging data 
between NFC phones. It is feasible to generate a malicious poster by an attacker with 
manipulated NDEF tags by modifying a commercial poster [71-73], leading malicious 
content sharing with the attacker. A solution is signing tags appropriated encryption 
approaches or using cryptographic tag authentication protocols [72][74].   
The other vulnerability of the NFC is Radio Frequency (RF) Interface. In accordance 
with some studies in [75-78], this type of attack is including "Eavesdropping MITM 
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Attacks","Data Corruption, Modification and Insertion", "DOS Attacks", "Relay 
Attacks" and "Phishing by Social Engineering" (a social process by which an attacker 
learns the information from the user about a targeted attack.) The solution proposed 
by [68] is to set up a secure communication between NFC phones by using a shared 
secret via a "key agreement protocol" introduced in [68].  
Another type of the NFC vulnerability is related to NFC device and Secure Element, 
including: running the application on the ―Host Controller‖in the absence of 
informing the user, installing the malware on the "Host Controller" or "Secure 
Element", attack against the NFC controller, adding "modified Secure Element" to 
the NFC mobile, skimming and token cloning attacks and eavesdropping the "over-
the-air" (abbreviated "OTA") [79][80].  
"Management of Secure Element" (modifying the data in the SE via the host 
controller) in which the data stored into the SE may be modified "Host Controller". 
This property may cause adistant data management the SE and because of this 
reason, so-called as over-the-air management) [81] [63].  
The proposed solutions for such these types of attacks are including: 1. ―certificate 
based authentication mechanisms‖, 2. ―key management policies to authenticate for 
the secure element measures‖ [84], 3. ―mandatory code signing for NFC API‖ and 4. 
―cryptographically linking the application to unique identifiers‖ [79][80]. 
9.2   Migration from RFID Cards towards NFC Enabled Mobile 
The first generation of the contactless payment was developed on RFID credit cards 
such as PayPass (Mastercard) [145], payWave (VISA) [146] and expressPay 
(American Express) [147]. In accordance with a research concerning the first 
generation of RFID credit cards by [84] all the examined cards were susceptible to 
both cardholder‘s privacy and relay attacks. These RFID credit cards have two major 
problems: limitation in application of contactless payment and security problems.  
In accordance with [82] the contactless applications are classified as four categories: 
The first type is Touch and Go where the cardholder only is able to wave the card 
without any confirmation to perform the transaction and thus only Micro 
transactions can be performed because of the limitation of the payment‘s amount 
(This limitation for MasterCard PayPass and Visa payWave is $50 and for 
expressPay is $25) [83]. The second type is Touch and Conform in which the 
cardholder must confirm the transaction, either by using the PIN or other 
approaches. Thereby in this type, the device must be equipped with an input/output 
(like keyboard and screen) for confirmation process. The third one is Touch and 
Connect to perform a ―peer to peer datatransferring‖ and the last one is Touch and 
Explore in which the cardholder can explore more than one application according to 
the device capabilities. In accordance with [82] the devices without any energy 
resource (i.e. battery) are able to perform only the two first types of applications (i.e. 
Touch and Go and Touch and Conform). On the other hand, because the credit cards 
have no input/output interaction possibility to confirm the transaction, in case of 
performing a transaction more than Micro payment, the cardholder has to wave the 
card a second time to enter the PIN via the POS terminal [82] and thus the RFID 
credit cards are only able to perform the Touch and Go and Micro payments that 
because of lack of the interaction confirmation by the cardholder is more vulnerable 
in security issues. Consequently, RFID credit cards cannot satisfy the contactless 
authentication benefits i.e. quick and easy [82]. Thus, another device such as mobile 
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phone which is equipped with input/output (i.e. screen and keyboard) and energy 
resource (i.e. batteries) is more appropriate to perform all four categories of the 
contactless applications [82].  
In this way, there are two type mobile phone capable to contactless or NFC 
payments: [82] dual chip in which a SIM card is dedicated for the mobile usage along 
with an NFC chip for the contactless payment and single chip where a payment card 
is merged to the SIM card as a unique entity for both payment and mobile usage 
along with an NFC chip for Radio Frequency interaction with the NFC reader [82].  
In accordance with [85] the most important security issue in mobile NFC contactless 
payments is protection of the cardholder (here SIM holder) privacy and also against 
transaction denial and forgery. In accordance with [82] to achieve this protection 
level, the main targets are protection of sensitive data, securing both the payment 
application and the software platform and a tamper resistant hardware. 
9.3   Google Wallet, Android Pay, Apple Pay 
Google Wallet uses NFC along with an android application for mobile payments [87]. 
Google wallet contains an android application as a user interface to keep safe the 
wallet by using a PIN, along with several "Java Card applets" installed on the 
"Secure Element" to store the sensitive data. There is a "Secure Channel Protocol" 
(abbreviated "SCP02") between the SE and the "remote server" [88].  
The android operating system could be the main flaw of the Google Wallet due to its 
vulnerabilities against different malware attacks [90]. In December 2011 
viaForensics (currently NowSecure) divulged several flaws Google Wallet [91].  
In another type of attack against Google Wallet, Fuzz testing or fuzzing method 
which is in fact an approach for discovering the security loopholes in a software, 
operating system or a network [92] is used as an approach for an attack against 
Google Wallet in which after feeding the wallet application with corrupted data, the 
attacker discovers the vulnerabilities to inject designed specific NFC tags to the 
mobile phone to monitor the results [89][93].  
In another attack, an attacker is able to brute force attack against PIN stored on 
mobile device as an encoded string hash along with visible salt (i.e. a random 
additional input to a hash function) rather than storing on Secure Element [94-96]. 
 
Fig. 6. Relay attack on NFC introduced in [88] [97] 
A well-known problem with contactless payments is relay attack [88]. A research at 
Cambridge university [97] demonstrates possibility of a relay attack based on ISO 
14443A contactless smart card up to 50 meters in which the attacker uses a 
contactless Smart Card temporarily in the absence of direct accessibilityand thereby 
the cardholder will not be able to be informed from the attack. Authors in [98] 
demonstrates the timing constraints of ISO 14443A leads to limitations to defeat the 
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relay attacks. Also, in accordance with [97] [98] it is not feasible to prevent this type 
of attacks via application (software) layer. 
Fig.5 shows the relay attack requirements [88] [99] including: a relay reader so-called 
as Mole [97], a card emulator so-called as Proxy [97] to exchange information with 
the ―legitimate reader‖ and a ―fast communication channel‖.  
For the relay attack, in contrary to [97] [138] which use physical layer and bit 
transferring level, the more recent approaches [139-142] use application layer and 
transferring Application Protocol Data Units (abbreviated APDU) to relax timing 
limitations and raising relay distance [88]. One of the limitations in this type of relay 
attacks (i.e. software based) is that exchanging the APDUs with SE which is a 
tamper resistant device. The access control schemes of SE are a main flaw which is 
relied on the "operating system" and thereby "Secure Element" trusts blindly the 
processor decision which is an insecure element [88].  
The second attempt from Google in mobile payment is Android Pay which is a free 
service allowing the customer to use the mobile which runs android 4.4 or higher for 
electronic payments at POS terminals [100][101]. It works similarly to Apple Pay 
[102].  
In accordance with the android website‘s information, the Primary Account Number 
(PAN) is not sent to the merchant, but it employs a "virtual account number" to show 
the user information [103].  
To support the catch suspicious activities, the customer after transaction, is able to 
see where the transaction is occurred along with the merchant‘s name and number 
[103].   
In case of losing or stealing the phone, the cardholder is able to immediately lock the 
mobile phone from anywhere and renew the password or erasing all personal 
information [103].  
Another similar technology is Apple Pay introduced in October 20, 2014 with iPhone 
6 [104].  
Apple Pay integrates both biometric authentication and tokenization approach for its 
mobile payment system [87].   
At time of registration, after adding the Primary Account Number (PAN) to apple 
wallet (called Passbook) a unique and encrypted number (called as Device Account 
Number) is stored within dedicated SE in iPhone as a token by using Tokenization 
process. The actual PAN is not stored in apple server and never shared with the 
merchant or the acquirer bank. The tokenization and de-tokenization process is 
performed on the card manufacturer network (e.g. VISA or MasterCard) and not in 
processor or payment gateway [104].  Finally, the mobile sends a one-time 
transaction code to the merchant [105].  
Meantime, Apple Pay needs NFC antenna along with Touch ID on iPhone 6 and a 
problem of such this payment systems (similar to Google Wallet) is difficulty for a 
significant number of people to provide them because of their price [87]. 
10. CONCLUSION 
In this comprehensive survey, we evaluated all most dominant electronic payment 
systems and the most successful attack strategies against them, including: Card-
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present (CP) transactions along with a review of the dominant card-present standard 
i.e. EMV including several researches to determine several types of attacks against 
this standard including MITM, pre-play and relay attacks which demonstrates lack 
of a secure ―offline‖ authentication method that is one of the main purpose of using 
the smart cards instead of magnetic stripe cards which is participating in 
authentication process, the evaluation of the EMV migration from RSA cryptosystem 
to ECC based cryptosystem, the evaluation of the CNP transactions approaches 
including 3D Secure, 3D SET, SET/EMV and EMV/CAP, the impact of concept of 
Tokenization and the role of Blind Signatures schemes in electronic cash and E-
payment systems, using quantum key distribution (QKD) in electronic payment 
systems to achieve unconditional security rather than only computational assurance 
of the security level by using traditional cryptography, the assessment of the 
electronic currency and peer to peer payment systems such as bitcoin, Near Field 
Communication (NFC) and contactless payment systems along with the evaluation of 
the related technologies such as Google wallet, Android Pay and Apple Pay.   
This comprehensive survey demonstrates the current status of financial transactions 
and electronic payment systems. The result demonstrates that in all types of 
electronic payment systems (i.e. CP, CNP, Contactless, Decentralized) there is some 
important flaws and weaknesses in security, user privacy, anonymity and 
performance. It is crucial to enhance and improve the current level of the security of 
the financial transaction systems, with respect to all necessary properties to achieve 
a secure and reliable payment system. 
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